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Abstract.
BACKGROUND: Stress is common to the experience of TBI. Stressors challenge physical and psychological coping abilities 
and undermine wellbeing. Brain injury constitutes a specific chronic stressor. An issue that hinders the usefulness of a stress-
based approach to brain injury is a lack of semantic clarity attaching to the term stress. A more precise conceptualisation of 
stress that embraces experienced uncertainty is allostasis.
OBJECTIVE: An emerging body of research, collectively identifiable as ‘the social cure’ literature, shows that the groups 
that people belong to can promote adjustment, coping, and well-being amongst individuals confronted with injuries, illnesses, 
traumas, and stressors. The idea is deceptively simple, yet extraordinarily useful: the sense of self that individuals derive 
from belonging to social groups plays a key role in determining health and well-being. The objective of this research was to 
apply a social cure perspective to a consideration of an individual’s lived experience of TBI.
METHODS: In a novel application of interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) this research has investigated one 
person’s lived experience in a single case study of traumatic brain injury.
RESULTS: Paradox, shifting perspectives and self under stress, linked by uncertainty, were the themes identified. 
CONCLUSIONS: A relational approach must be key to TBI rehabilitation.
Keywords: IPA, TBI, rehabilitation, phenomenology, brain injury, social cure, relational20
1. Introduction and literature review21
In-depth examination of the single case has a long22
and fruitful history in cognitive and clinical neuropsy-23
chology (McPherson & Della Sala, 2019). Indeed,24
discussing memory, Shallice writes that “most of the25
greatest scientific advances from neuropsychologi-26
cal investigations has come from studies of a single27
patient, or less frequently, a few similar patients, each28
treated as individuals” (Shallice 2019, p.1). A key29
strength of the single case in the current context is that30
it permits an increased understanding of how an indi-31
vidual with brain injury experiences the world. The32
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research presented herein demonstrates that uncer- 33
tainty is the fulcrum on which one survivor’s lived 34
experience of traumatic brain injury (TBI) pivots. 35
Once, in his own words, our participant used to be 36
a man who shrugged things off. Now, uncertainty, 37
experienced as a consequence of living with brain 38
injury, has rendered that old shrugging-self eclipsed 39
by a more precarious self. Accordingly, the authors 40
suggest that mitigation of uncertainty should be key 41
to effective rehabilitation following TBI. The pri- 42
mary challenge faced by the researchers in writing 43
this report was to present the reality of uncertainty, 44
as it manifests in the lived experience of our partic- 45
ipant, and those around him, in a frame possessing 46
sufficient conceptual rigour. Therefore this paper is 47
guided by the concept of allostasis, specifically the 48
view that coping with stress requires production of 49
strategies that can mitigate uncertainty about the50
future. In employing IPA the authors provide insights51
into one survivor’s attempt to adjust following a52
severe TBI. The purpose of this paper is, through53
focusing intensely on one person’s lived experience,54
to produce transferable knowledge that may usefully55
be applied in both clinical and research contexts.56
1.1. Brain injury57
TBI is a leading cause of death and disability in58
young adults throughout the world: fifty million peo-59
ple experience a TBI every year, with an estimated60
yearly cost of $US400 billion (Maas et al., 2017).61
TBI may significantly impact a person’s social, cog-62
nitive, emotional and behavioural functioning, which63
may hamper a return to previous roles (Hoofien et al.,64
2001). Issues of identity and mood are key aspects65
of medium to long-term outcome following injury66
(Scholten et al., 2016), and are arguably more impor-67
tant to the individual than their functional outcome.68
1.2. Allostasis and allostatic load69
Stress is common to the experience of TBI (e.g.,70
Qureshi et al., 2019). Cannon (1932) was one of71
the first academics to apply the concept of stress72
to homeostasis in humans (Romero, Dickens, &73
Cyr, 2008). The idea, borrowed from engineering,74
acknowledges that external pressures affect people.75
Explicitly, stress-causing agents (stressors) if acute76
or prolonged, challenge physical and psychologi-77
cal coping abilities and undermine wellbeing. From78
this perspective, brain injury represents a specific79
chronic stressor (Walsh, Fortune, Gallagher, & Mul-80
doon, 2014). Noting this, Walsh et al. (2014) posit that81
the integrated social identity model of stress (Haslam,82
2004) is pertinent to the study of acquired brain injury83
(ABI). The model emphasises the need for theorists to84
consider social and contextual factors that traditional85
approaches often neglect. This is especially true with86
individualised conditions such as brain injury, where87
there is a tendency to focus on the person. The88
integrated social identity model of stress provides89
an alternative approach by viewing groups as cen-90
tral to the experience and perception of brain injury91
and resulting stress (Muldoon, Schmid, & Downes,92
2009). This approach is also relevant to under-93
standing related concepts, and explicitly perceived94
control (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Other integral95
concepts within the extant stress literature related96
to ABI, and ABI rehabilitation, include moving97
beyond individualism, group memberships, social 98
identities, context, and perceived control. 99
An issue that hinders the usefulness of a stress- 100
based approach to brain injury is lack of semantic 101
clarity. The term ‘stress’ requires clarification 102
because the term denotes both the agent that 103
causes the response, and the reaction. Furthermore, 104
over-stimulation of an emergency response results 105
in ‘chronic stress’, which is associated with stress 106
related disease (Romero, Dickens, & Cyr, 2008). 107
Thus, in order to use the term stress appropriately, 108
linguistic disambiguation and operationalisation is 109
necessary. In the present study, the authors link stress 110
with lack of certainty. This is because uncertainty 111
is a stressor that undermines the capacity to predict, 112
plan, and behave efficaciously (Hogg. 2007/2016). 113
A more precise conceptualisation of stress that 114
embraces uncertainty is allostasis. Allostatic load is 115
what happens in terms of neuroendocrine, cardio- 116
vascular, neuroenergetic, and emotional terms when 117
stress responses have become chronically activated 118
(McEwan, 1998). In the context of TBI, allostatic 119
load describes the situation when brains, organs 120
whose function is to reduce uncertainty, are unable 121
to resolve uncertainty (Peters, McEwan, & Friston, 122
2017). Hence, allostasis is an important concept 123
because it recognises that stressed individuals 124
perceive themselves as lacking control (Peters, 125
McEwan, & Friston, 2017). 126
Taking things further, brain injury can usefully 127
be understood as a chronic stressor (Walsh, For- 128
tune, Gallagher, & Muldoon, 2014). Expanding on 129
this point, Walsh et al. (2014) argue that the inte- 130
grated social identity model of stress (Haslam, 2004) 131
highlights the importance of attending to the social 132
and contextual factors, often neglected in individu- 133
alised considerations of illness, and can thus usefully 134
be applied to the study of TBI. Not least because 135
the model moves beyond individualistic analyses of 136
stress. The integrated social identity model of stress 137
regards groups as central to the experience and per- 138
ception of stress (Muldoon, Schmid, & Downes, 139
2009). It is also important to consider the issue of per- 140
ceived control (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984); Green- 141
away et al. (2015) having demonstrated that social 142
identity is a significant predictor of perceived control. 143
1.3. The social nature of human beings 144
In the early twentieth century, Vygotsky and Luria, 145
founding fathers of modern neuropsychology, strove 146


















































2010). In more recent years, a free energy princi-
ple has been proposed which attempts to provide 
a unified brain theory with particular reference to 
action, perception, and learning. Friston (2010), in 
a consideration of the free energy principle (i.e. 
any self-organising system that is in equilibrium 
with its environment must minimize free energy) 
argues that the crucial characteristic of biological 
systems is their capacity to maintain homeostasis in 
an environment that is perpetually subject to change. 
Moreover, Friston argues that maintaining homeosta-
sis requires biological agents to minimize the surprise 
that they experience. Friston (2010) suggests that 
there are two methods open to agents in order to 
avoid surprising states (i.e. uncertainty): (1) Change 
the world by acting upon it; and (2) Change their own 
internal states.
1.4. Social identity
Lieberman (2013) reasons that contemporary sci-
ence, including psychology, has a blind spot for ‘the 
social’. The self is important because it is ‘a super-
highway for social influence’ (Lieberman, 2013, p.9). 
One of the most rigorous and successful ways of 
conceptualising the self is in terms of social iden-
tity (Tajfel, 1974), whereby a person’s sense of self is 
understood as a derivative of the groups they belong 
to, together with the social and value significance that 
accompanies group membership(s).
The social identity literature links groups and 
stress (e.g., Muldoon & Lowe, 2012). Moreover, 
Haslam, Jetten, Cruwys, Dingle, & Haslam (2018) 
have developed the social identity approach into a 
new psychology of health. This provides a strong 
theoretical foundation for linking a range of condi-
tions, including stress and brain injury, to the idea of 
self. The literature also associates groups with uncer-
tainty. Hogg (2007//2016) developed uncertainty –
identity theory, which derives from the premise that 
individuals are unsettled and confounded by indeter-
minate factors, particularly when they do not know 
how they should behave individually, or towards oth-
ers. Hogg (2016) claims that uncertainty, because of 
the impact it has on identity (i.e. ‘self’ understood 
from a social identity point of view), makes it difficult 
for individuals to act efficaciously. Concomitantly, 
individuals become motivated to reduce self-relevant 
uncertainty.
One particularly effective way to reduce self-
related uncertainty is through social categorisation. 
The reason for this is that social categorisation197
provides individuals with prototypes that offer tem- 198
plates as to how they, and others, should behave. 199
Prototypes based on social categorisation allow indi- 200
viduals to know how they should feel. Consequently, 201
the more uncertain that one is about oneself, the more 202
one will strive to belong to groups (Hogg, 2014). 203
Wilson, Gracey, Evans, and Bateman (2009) give 204
powerful, coherent, and persuasive voice to a clini- 205
cal acknowledgement of the necessity to engage with 206
the biological, psychological, and social aspects of 207
rehabilitation following TBI. Emotional and iden- 208
tity adjustment are key to rehabilitation and, given 209
the understanding of identity set forth in preceding 210
paragraphs, it seems (to borrow from and paraphrase 211
Baddeley, 1993) that a rehabilitation approach that 212
lacks a relational aspect is akin to a vehicle without 213
an engine because rehabilitation is about the ‘bio’, 214
the ‘psycho’ and the ‘social’. 215
1.5. Interpretative phenomenological analysis 216
(IPA) 217
IPA has a focus on the detailed examination of 218
human lived experience (Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 219
2009). As a psychological approach, IPA is under- 220
pinned by three key areas in the philosophy of 221
knowledge: phenomenology, hermeneutics, and idio- 222
graphy. 223
1.5.1. Phenomenology 224
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, a phenomenological 225
philosopher, was much taken with the usefulness 226
of applying an understanding of human nature as 227
embodied. Crucially, for those interested in TBI and 228
rehabilitation, Merleau-Ponty was also much taken 229
with the idea of the intrinsically social nature of 230
human existence. In essence, Merleau-Ponty con- 231
cluded that human beings cannot exist without others 232
(Bakewell, 2016). ‘Phenomenology helps physicians. 233
It makes it possible to consider medical symptoms 234
as they are experienced by the patient rather than 235
exclusively as a physical process’ (Bakewell, 2016, 236
p.42). IPA is likely the most common contemporary 237
approach to phenomenological psychology in the UK 238
(Langdridge, 2007). 239
Phenomenology is a philosophical approach 240
whose focus is on lived experience. Intentionality is a 241
key idea for those who would harness a phenomeno- 242
logical approach for the purpose of psychological 243
analysis. Intentionality is the idea that when we are 244
conscious, there is always something that is the object 245
of our consciousness. A thing that we are ‘conscious 246
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of’. To the perceiver, consciousness, and the object247
of consciousness, are one (Bakewell, 2016).248
1.5.2. Hermeneutics249
Hermeneutics is the theory of interpretation and a250
consideration of hermeneutics highlights the iterative251
process of a phenomenological analysis. Qualitative252
analysis is often described in a linear fashion – mov-253
ing forward through the data. IPA analysis is not254
linear (Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009) and, as such,255
it is worth highlighting the recursive nature of IPA256
analysis257
1.5.3. Idiography258
Idiography, a concern with the particular, has been259
a major influence on IPA. This concern manifests at260
two levels. First, IPA is committed to in-depth and261
detailed analysis of the phenomena on which it is262
focused. Second, IPA is concerned with how expe-263
riential phenomena are understood from particular264
perspectives. Hence the effective use of single case265
analysis and the commitment to the single case in its266
own right. This idiographic focus on the particular is267
‘in contrast to most psychology which is ‘nomoth-268
etic’ and concerned with making claims at the group269
or population level, and with establishing general270
laws of human behaviour’ (Smith, Flowers, & Larkin,271
2009, p.29).272
The goal with IPA is thus not generalisable knowl-273
edge; the goal is transferable knowledge.274
2. Method275
2.1. Research question276
With a particular focus on stress, coping and recov-277
ery, what is the lived experience of TBI?278
2.2. Participant279
The study recruited the participant, ‘P’, from280
existing professional networks. In order to ensure281
anonymity, the authors report only general partici-282
pant details. P is a married man, in his forties. He is283
a father of three teenage children, who works full-284
time in a professional capacity. Two years prior to285
the interview, the participant suffered a severe, life-286
threatening TBI following a high-speed bicycle fall287
while participating in a race. P was wearing a helmet288
at the time, but still sustained a serious injury to his289
left frontal lobe. To convey a sense of the injury in 290
his own words P reported: 291
‘I was coming down xxx pass from the car park 292
towards xxx going fast, because it’s downhill. Erm, 293
nobody knows what happened because nobody saw 294
what happened. I don’t remember anything happen- 295
ing but I came off my bike erm who knows how, and 296
hit my head. There is speculation that I may have hit 297
it against the wall because the wall is very close to 298
the side of the road there. Like only a foot or so away 299
from the wall. So if you do go over the handlebars 300
for whatever reason, there is a good chance that you 301
are going to hit the wall. Erm so I ended up cutting 302
my head. So I actually had a wound, It was more than 303
just a wound, or a bang in the head. It was actually 304
cut open as well. So I hit something sharp. Erm, in 305
the process and then must have skidded on my side 306
quite a long way because the whole of my right hand 307
side was grazed. Erm, yeah and some walkers got to 308
me. They heard it. They heard me crash, and they 309
got to me and they basically held me together. They 310
basically held my head together. . . . 311
So what had happened is that I’d basically, I’d, it 312
was a complete, I dunno what you call it, whole piece 313
of skull. It was a depressed fracture. So a whole piece 314
of skull had snapped. About the size of a saucer I 315
suppose. A tea cup saucer, a whole piece of skull had 316
been broken and then pushed into my brain. And the 317
eye socket had hinged and apparently there’s some 318
sharp bits at the back of your eye socket and that 319
had sort of, one of those had gone up because it had 320
hinged. It had gone up. Punctured the membrane. 321
Gone into my brain. Erm and there was bleeding 322
on the brain. 323
So it was a severe injury and basically the walkers 324
got to me and sort of kept me together. From what I’ve 325
heard, I understand there was an ambulance at the top, 326
or not too far away anyway and the ambulance was 327
called. I think that the second person on the scene 328
was a nurse and then they got the road ambulance. 329
The road ambulance basically stabilised me. Got me 330
to xxx hospital. xxx hospital then took one look at 331
me and said we’re not touching you. And then I got 332
airlifted to Yyy which is the head trauma centre. Erm, 333
they cleaned me out on that Saturday and they did the 334
big op on the Tuesday’. 335
2.3. Interview 336
The interview process took place on University 337
premises and lasted for approximately one hour dur- 338
ing which the participant (P) read an information 339
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sheet, completed a consent form, and had the oppor-340
tunity to ask questions about the research at hand.341
2.4. Transcription342
The interview was recorded on an audio device343
and transcribed immediately afterwards by the inter-344
viewer (SW).345
2.5. Analysis346
IPA analysis is an iterative, recursive process. As347
such, we felt that it makes sense, adds coherence, and348
renders our analysis more transparent, to report, and349
discuss, our results in a manner that mirrors that in350
which we produced them. Smith, Flowers and Larkin351
(2009) make clear that there is no ‘right’ way to352
do IPA. One advantage of the manner in which we353
present our results in this paper, in combination with354
method and discussion, is that it makes our sense-355
making of the participant’s sense-making transparent.356
This double hermeneutic is absolutely fundamental357
to IPA and, in our opinion, it emphasises the golden358
thread of narrative that runs throughout our report –359
uncertainty is at the heart of the lived experience of360
TBI.361
IPA analysis was conducted in the manner sug-362
gested by Smith, Flowers and Larkin (2009): 1.363
Reading and re-reading; 2. Initial noting; 3. Devel-364
oping emergent themes; 4. Searching for connections365
across emergent themes. In order to break the narra-366
tive flow and deconstruct the transcript we utilised a367
suggestion that Smith et al offer and worked through368
the transcript backwards, paragraph by paragraph,369
as well as reading from start to finish in the usual370
manner.371
After working on initial coding of the transcript the372
first author passed on a synopsis of initial codes to the373
remaining authors for their input. These initial codes374
were accompanied by the transcript, as annotated by375
the first author.376
Linguistic comments; comments pertaining to con-377
cepts; and descriptive comments (i.e. pertaining to378
meaning and concerns). All of the co-authors dis-379
cussed and agreed initial coding at this stage. The380
initial codes are outlined below.381
2.6. Linguistic comments382
There was interesting movement between the383
active voice and the passive voice, between engaged384
and detached, and between first person and third per- 385
son. 386
Examples: 387
In the opening part of the interview, P talks about 388
a whole piece of skull snapping and ‘it was a severe 389
injury’. He doesn’t say ‘I had’ but rather ‘it was’. 390
This reflects his experience. In describing the injury 391
he begins from a position of detachment. 392
Similarly, a little later, P says: ‘So obviously, my 393
brain had already processed that there was something 394
going on’. 395
This seems a rather distanced way for P to speak 396
of himself. Slightly jarring. 397
The language used during the interview serves to 398
position P as passive. ‘I ended up in xxx’ 399
However, there is a shift in gear after about 5 min- 400
utes into the interview when P says: ‘I had a serious 401
confabulation’. 402
Not ‘my brain had’ or ‘the injury rendered me 403
confused’ but ‘I had’. It’s interesting that the next 404
sentence evidences concern with using the correct ter- 405
minology. Is this about validating his experience? It 406
later transpires that P has had previous mental health 407
issues. Is the change of gear because he is on ‘safer 408
ground’ talking about mental health than TBI? 409
It is notable that, excepting on one occasion, the 410
language P used for family members might be read as 411
rather distant and does not use any names. ‘My wife’, 412
‘she,’ ‘they,’ ‘the kids,’ ‘my mother,’ are the order of 413
the day. It may be that this language is indicative of 414
distance, or detachment. 415
A line that jumped off the page at us on first reading 416
the transcript is where P says that he latches on to 417
‘an idea then peck people’s heads about it’. This is a 418
most vivid use of language and it serves to position 419
P as both engaged, and as an outsider poking in. It 420
is reminiscent of Socrates and the gadfly. Perhaps 421
we are reading too much into this line, but it does 422
convey a somewhat ominous feeling of discomfort to 423
the reader. 424
When linking his experience of TBI to his depres- 425
sion, P takes possession of the narrative: 426
’I equate (TBI) as very similar to my experiences 427
with depression’. 428
It may be that the same thing is at play here as 429
in the section mentioned earlier where there was the 430
shift in gear to ‘I’. 431
As the interview proceeds we move back to the 432
more passive version of P. 433
‘My personality is quite project-focused’. 434
Not ‘I am . . . .’, instead, P is quoting himself. He 435
is very much in the observer role here and it conveys 436
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an impression of unemotional detachment from the437
thoughts described. Almost cold.438
‘I’m not going to let this little brain injury thing439
stop me . . . .’440
P refers to his marriage as ‘the relationship’.441
Not ‘my relationship’/’ my marriage’ etc. Again,442
this might be perceived as detachment. Also, there is443
evidence of loss (on the family’s part) behind the way444
language was deployed here.445
As the interview approaches the half-way point we446
have another shift of gear back to ‘I’. This shift was447
prompted by the question about uncertainty and we448
think it is because the device of ‘project focus’ is449
being used to position P as having some element of450
control over his life and circumstances.451
‘I can keep going a bit more’452
It seems that positioning and control is also behind453
P’s description of what was a life- threatening and454
life-altering TBI as a455
‘serious bump on the head’456
2.7. Concepts457
There were some fascinating concepts in this tran-458
script.459
The first concept we picked out was the concept of460
project and project focus. For example, P says that ‘I461
see my life in terms of projects’462
Across the entirety of this interview, uncertainty463
loomed large and it is interesting how the concepts464
of the project and uncertainty are almost opposi-465
tional, or counterbalancing, in terms of each other.466
The impression we derived from the transcript is of467
finely balanced coping:468
“It may be a bounce back reaction and it’s like469
I’m on my second life now so I’m just going to go470
for it. But there is that niggling idea that I’ve dam-471
aged my brain. Whether that’s noticeable on a day472
to day level and whether that has any effect on473
any future deterioration of any sort. I don’t know.474
But there’s part of me that goes . . . It just give you475
that sense of mortality and it’s like I don’t know476
how much longer I’ve got with a fully functioning477
mental capacity. So you kind of have a project and478
this is like what I want to achieve now because479
its, I don’t know, just in terms of work, it’s like480
thinking through to retirement at 65 is like I481
don’t know if I have that long left. That might be482
something that everyone thinks at my age, or not,483
I don’t know. But from my perspective it’s like484
I don’t know how many good years I’ve got”.485
A second concept that we identified in the tran- 486
script is the link to depression. At several points, P 487
links his previous experience of depression with his 488
current experience of TBI: 489
“But then I see it’s (i.e. the TBI) very similar as to 490
when I was diagnosed with the depression. People 491
start or at least it feels like they start treating me 492
differently because they now see you as a medical 493
case and in both of these I’ve always argued, it’s 494
like stop medicalising me” 495
“And it feels the same with my depression” 496
There is also a conceptualisation of the person that 497
is both social and personal. There is, on the one hand, 498
a thread invoking an almost unconscious need for 499
recognition of context, and a holistic view of P’s being 500
in the world, running through the entire transcript. On 501
the other hand, there is a view that P is very much an 502
individual. It seems that this was evident to P who 503
felt the need to express it explicitly at the end of the 504
interview: 505
“Another thing I want to say is that the whole 506
person-centred element is quite erm current. And 507
you know you get quite person-centred learning 508
and person-centred counselling. So just from my 509
experience the whole person-centred approach to 510
dealing with brain injury and listening to their 511
experience. What I struggle with medically is that 512
the medical system focuses on the patient and 513
it is all about the patient and patient care. And 514
fails to see a more holistic view in terms of the 515
family and the kids. So if I go to the doctor and 516
say I’ve had a brain injury, they’ll say ‘ok’ and 517
I’ll deal with you and they may listen to you. 518
But the family and the kids, they’re their own 519
problem. Not part of the solution and the listening 520
process”. 521
Perceptions and differences in perceptions figured 522
prominently in the interview: P sees his injury as a 523
predominantly physical thing. For his family, it’s a 524
psychological event. P is blasé about it whereas for 525
his family it is traumatic. For P it is a progression, 526
and for his family it is a triggering event: 527
“I see it more as a progression thing rather than a 528
purely post injury before and after because I see 529
there were things happening in my life, in me and 530
my relationship prior to the accident. Whereas I 531
think they tend to see it, they have the accident 532
very much as a, an event that triggered things. 533
Whereas I see there was an event, and it may have 534
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triggered things, changed things, but it may have535
just accelerated what was already happening and536
I see it within a much longer time frame”537
There is also a divergence of perspectives: For the538
family the injury was a shared, traumatic experience.539
Whereas for P it is experienced as a distant event:540
“I’m sort of distant from it in a way because they541
don’t talk to me that much and when I try to ask542
them then there seems to be this conflict about543
what they say they’re thinking and what my wife544
says is reporting to me what they’re thinking. It’s545
just a big muddy”.546
Then there are the differences with regard to P’s547
immediate family and those one step removed who548
see his as a miraculous recovery:549
“There’s a bit of conflict between her and my550
family because my mum is like ’oh what a mirac-551
ulous recovery,’ you know, we’re all so pleased552
and Mary (pseudonym) is like ‘You should try553
living with him’. (Both Laugh). It’s not all roses.554
So that has led to a bit of a fall out as well. Because555
its perspective and how close. Anyone who is like556
one step removed from me seems to think like I’m557
fine”.558
2.8. Descriptive comments (Meanings and559
concerns)560
The TBI has some overlap with P’s experience of561
depression in terms of what it means to him. But the562
different use of language around each suggests that563
the depression has been processed in a way that the564
TBI has not. For example, P tended to use the first565
person when speaking about his depression and the566
third person when speaking about his TBI. Is it that567
the depression is experienced as resolved?568
2.8.1. Uncertainty569
A couple of years after his accident, P returned to570
compete in, and complete, the event in which he had571
suffered the TBI. It may be that P’s return to the event572
where he almost died means significantly more to him573
than the mere ‘box to be ticked’ that he talked about574
in the interview, or a consequence of ‘project focus’.575
P’s description of the event he was taking part in at the576
time of his injury as ‘The bruiser’ is, perhaps, telling.577
We think that P’s description of the accident as a phys-578
ical event for him but as a psychologically traumatic579
one for his family is also telling. The accident means580
different things to different people. There is consider- 581
able uncertainty attaching to it. There seemed, to us, 582
to be scant overt emotion attaching to the TBI from 583
P’s perspective. However, we could not help but won- 584
der, on reading the transcript, whether the repetition 585
of the event may not have had something to do with 586
a desire to resolve and reduce uncertainty. Even if 587
this processing was taking place outside of conscious 588
awareness. 589
Lastly, there seems to be something pertaining to 590
both meaning and concern in that P experiences his 591
TBI as an event falling on the continuum of his life: 592
‘I always used to describe myself, before I was 593
depressed, as the man who shrugs. I used to 594
just shrug stuff off and I didn’t have any strong 595
feelings or care. It was like if you want to do 596
that, that’s fine. I’m not bothered. And since the 597
depression and maybe even more now, I’ve kind 598
of felt like I am standing up more for myself and 599
how that comes across is probably just rude and 600
aggressive (laughs). Particularly if that is in con- 601
trast to how I was 15 years ago or whatever. Then 602
it is suddenly like, you’re being a bit aggressive 603
here. Being a bit selfish and a bit self-centred and 604
all the rest. Whereas to me it is simply like I am 605
trying to get my point across.’ 606
Whereas for others in P’s immediate family, the 607
event is like a light switch moment. It is clear that 608
there is loss implied in his family’s experience. It is 609
less clear whether P is sharing that experience of loss 610
at an emotional level. 611
Another very important aspect is that P is still ‘a 612
valid human being’. 613
For P: “one particular stress (is) around the sort of 614
long term effects and changes, I equate as very sim- 615
ilar to my experiences with depression. Erm, in that 616
two things. One is that my kind of denial and inabil- 617
ity to see how I’ve changed. It’s clear that my wife 618
and she reports some of our friends, see that I behave 619
differently. And that I am somehow quite different. 620
And that’s not seen with my work colleagues. So it is 621
only people who are close and sort of live with me or 622
have experienced me closely see those changes that 623
maybe even I don’t see. Some of them I can accept on 624
a kind of intellectual level. But I don’t see that I am 625
radically different now as I was then. Because that’s 626
a conflict, I think that’s quite stressful. But then I see 627
it’s very similar as to when I was diagnosed with the 628
depression. People start or at least it feels like they 629
start treating me differently because they now see you 630
as a medical case and in both of these I’ve always 631
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argued, it’s like stop medicalising me. You’re treat-632
ing me like I’m a case book and I just find that really633
stresses me. I’m still a person. I’m still a valid human634
being. It feels like other people are always interpret-635
ing you and analysing you through that perspective of636
‘you’ve got a brain injury’ or ‘you’ve behaved differ-637
ently’ or ‘your personality has changed’ or whatever638
it is. And it feels like you are no longer being taken639
at face value.”640
3. Themes and discussion641
IPA begins with, but should go beyond, a standard642
thematic analysis (Brocki & Wearden, 2006). Fol-643
lowing initial coding, we identified four themes. In644
line with the guidance offered by Braun and Clarke645
(2006), these themes were produced/arrived at by646
organising those codes that had been identified in the647
first stage of analysis into bigger patterns of mean-648
ing that spoke directly to our research question. We649
also tried to take on board the advice of Smith and650
Osborne (2003, p.71) to imagine a magnet with some651
of the themes pulling others in and helping to make652
sense of them.653
As the analysis proceeded recursively in steps,654
developing emergent themes and searching for con-655
nections across emergent themes merged, producing656
connected themes: 1. Paradox/contradiction; 2. Shift-657
ing perspectives/discontinuity; 3. Self under stress.658
Uncertainty was an overarching theme.659
In order to keep on the phenomenological track, the660
four aspects of life-world (temporality [experience of661
time], spatiality [experience of space], embodiment662
[experience of being in a body], and inter-subjectivity663
[the relational aspect of lived experience]) guided the664
authors. These acted as focal points during theme665
exploration. It is also necessary to state that, in line666
with the IPA guidance offered by Smith, Flowers, and667
Larkin (2009), theme construction primarily derived668
from coding notes. The purpose of conducting anal-669
ysis in this way was to facilitate breaking up of670
transcript narrative flow. This represents a manifes-671
tation of the hermeneutic circle, where the themes672
identified capture and reflect understanding (Smith,673
Flowers, & Larkin, 2009).674
3.1. Paradox675
The ‘paradox’ theme is important. Before coming676
to the specifics of the case at hand, it is worth not-677
ing that one significant, and generally unconsidered,678
paradox is that the experience of TBI is simul- 679
taneously intensely individual and intensely social 680
(Walsh, Fortune, Gallagher, & Muldoon, 2014). His- 681
torically, approaches to brain injury rehabilitation 682
have been rooted in individualism. These individu- 683
alistic ways of understanding TBI were, and remain, 684
important. However, individual selves can also be 685
understood as reflective of social constructs which 686
arise from social contexts. Hence, it is useful to view 687
TBI as having a social aspect. 688
The social and individualistic frames for under- 689
standing TBI are not ‘either/or’. Yes, it is paradoxical 690
that TBI is both individual and social. However, 691
Bowen, Yeates and Palmer (2010) propose that in 692
order to understand fully what lies within the brain, 693
neuropsychological inquiry must look outwards to 694
social relations and context. 695
Furthermore, it has not escaped our notice that 696
there is also a contradiction in our using a single case 697
study to explore ‘the social’. 698
In considering the lived experience of P, we find 699
much that is paradoxical. For example, P is both 700
detached (e.g., ‘Erm, so yeah. I’m sort of distant from 701
it in a way because they don’t talk to me that much 702
and when I try to ask them then there seems to be this 703
conflict about what they say they’re thinking and what 704
my wife says is reporting to me what they’re think- 705
ing’.) and engaged (e.g., ‘ I latch onto an idea then 706
peck peoples heads about it’); active (e.g. ‘I’m quite 707
project focused. And I think I have become more so 708
since the injury’) and passive (e.g.,’ So obviously, my 709
brain had already processed that there was something 710
going on’; ‘my personality is quite project focused’); 711
individual and social (explored further in ‘self under 712
threat’ theme); ABI is seen as both a continuum with 713
the past (e.g., ‘I always used to describe myself, 714
before I was depressed, as the man who shrugs. I used 715
to just shrug stuff off and I didn’t have any strong 716
feelings or care. It was like if you want to do that, 717
that’s fine. I’m not bothered. And since the depres- 718
sion, and maybe even more now, I’ve kind of felt like 719
I am standing up more for myself and how that comes 720
across is probably just rude and aggressive (laughs). 721
Particularly if that is in contrast to how I was 15 years 722
ago or whatever. Then it is suddenly, like, you’re 723
being a bit aggressive here. Being a bit selfish and a 724
bit self-centred and all the rest. Whereas to me it is 725
simply like I am trying to get my point across.’) and 726
as a break with the past (e.g., ‘ And this is probably 727
where it is a sticking point, I see it more as a progres- 728
sion thing rather than a purely post injury before and 729
after because I see there were things happening in my 730
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life, in me and my relationship prior to the accident.731
Whereas I think they tend to see it, they have the732
accident very much as a, an event that triggered733
things. Whereas I see there was an event, and it may734
have triggered things, changed things, but it may735
have just accelerated what was already happening736
and I see it within a much longer time frame’).737
Platt (2001) discusses the use of paradox in738
Shakespeare and argues that a recognition of the739
paradoxical nature of the world is a prerequisite for740
cognitive growth. According to Platt, this applies to741
both characters and audience (intrinsically social and742
individual!). We argue that Shakespeare, perhaps the743
shrewdest observer of human nature to ever write in744
the English language, picked up on something that745
we, as psychologists focused on rehabilitation, can746
usefully apply to thinking about rehabilitation fol-747
lowing brain injury – the idea that paradox needs to748
be recognised in order for a person to move forward749
and grow post TBI.750
Vygotsky (1978) offers an extraordinarily useful751
set of thinking tools to contemporary psychologists752
wishing to grapple with what appears to be para-753
dox. Cole and Scribner (1978, p.6–7) report that754
‘Vygotsky saw in the methods and principles of755
dialectical materialism a solution to key scientific756
paradoxes facing his contemporaries’. A central tenet757
of this method is that phenomena should be stud-758
ied and understood as processes in motion, and in759
change. Thus, when Vygotsky speaks of his approach760
as “developmental” this is not to be confused with761
a theory of child development. The developmental762
method, in Vygotsky’s view, is ‘the central method763
of psychological science’. The dialectic represents764
opposing directions of thought united in a contin-765
uous whole. This way of approaching paradox in766
a holistic manner allows us to transcend binary767
thinking and, in Vygotsky’s view, should facilitate768
an enhanced understanding of the human psyche769
(Daniels, 2008).770
As one of the research team (DF) was examin-771
ing the transcript for the first time, that hoary old772
‘two roads diverged in a yellow wood’ came to their773
mind. A question arose as to whether P’s narrative774
represented a ‘real’ (i.e. as others might consider it)775
or interpersonal/intrapersonal divergence. In the spe-776
cific case of P, and the broader context of TBI cases777
generally, these questions are there to be thought778
through. On discussion, amongst the authors, the779
diverging road image spoke to the image of a ‘Y’.780
One group of researchers who have spent consid-781
erable time on precisely this aspect of TBI, in terms782
of a ‘Y’ shaped model of the rehabilitation process, 783
are Wilson, Gracey, Evans, and Bateman (2009). Pic- 784
tured as a ‘Y’ the top left of the ‘Y’ is seen as 785
pre-injury self-representations, and the top right of 786
the ‘Y’ is seen as the self in current context. The gap 787
between both is the experience of self under threat. 788
Alternatively, discrepancy. Hence, the model fits eas- 789
ily with both Vygotskian understanding of lifespan 790
development as process, and the Allostatic brain lit- 791
erature which regards stress (in this case ABI) as a 792
generator of existential uncertainty. 793
It is noteworthy that TBI survivors often seem cog- 794
nitively intact to interviewers (and others) and that 795
the person with TBI does not perceive changes in 796
themselves in the same manner that their family mem- 797
bers do (Newby, Coetzer, Daisley, & Weatherhead, 798
2013). This is discussed further below. Rehabil- 799
itation, according to Wilson, Gracey, Evans, and 800
Bateman (2009) is about bringing the discrepant arms 801
of the ‘Y’ in the survivor’s rehabilitation process 802
together as TBI survivors integrate their pre- and post- 803
injury selves, as well as those around them, and the 804
world in general. 805
It is a paradox that P is both the same but differ- 806
ent, and the reasons are both individual and social. 807
Under the spotlight of TBI, the consequence of this 808
unresolvable paradox is uncertainty. 809
Newby, Coetzer, Daisley, & Weatherhead (2013) 810
report that disinhibition and social isolation are 811
common following TBI. Moreover, because sur- 812
vivors often do not experience the same changes as 813
those around them, others do not perceive that they 814
require rehabilitation. This discerned continuity, as 815
evidenced by P in this report, as well as the perception 816
of disinhibition on the part of the family, may reflect 817
an attempt to mitigate uncertainty. This process is thus 818
best understood holistically. Research has shown that 819
individuals experience greater change during times 820
of uncertainty, and when stress is high (Tedeschi & 821
Calhoun, 1996). 822
The uncertainty and stress literature (e.g., Peters, 823
McEwan, & Friston, 2017) outlines how, in contexts 824
where uncertainty remains unresolved, individuals 825
encounter allostatic load. Habituation is key to well- 826
being for those faced with long-term exposure to 827
allostatic load. Probability appraisal, in turn, is key 828
to habituation. Those who habituate do so by broad- 829
ening their probability expectations of goal states 830
divergence (Peters, McEwan, & Friston, 2017). In 831
other words, people predict that they will often be 832
wrong in their predictions. They become reconciled 833
with uncertainty. 834


















































Conclusion - Paradox: The certainty of uncertainty 
relieves uncertainty.
3.2. Shifting perspectives
Perspective-taking is about seeing, and appre-
ciating, things as others do. Perspective-taking is 
purposeful. Attempting to walk in another’s shoes, 
so to speak. Things that one can take a perspective on 
include situations, states, and objects (Echterhoff & 
Higgins, 2011). One reason that we take perspectives 
is to understand others and predict their behaviour. As 
outlined earlier in the paper, allostatic load, related 
to uncertainty, feeds into chronically activated stress 
responses.
In P’s narrative, perspective-shifting attempts are 
apparent throughout. P is concerned with how oth-
ers see him, he shifts between 1st and 3rd person 
when referring to himself. Considered from an allo-
static load framework, TBI generates a tsunami of 
uncertainty and delivers a double hit because: a) TBI 
constitutes an existential threat to the survivor, and 
those around them, and is thus both an acute and 
chronic source of uncertainty; b) An important pur-
pose of our brains is to come up with strategies that 
reduce uncertainty. TBI impacts the organ’s capacity 
to do this. Crucially it also impacts on the capacity to 
draw on social resources that might aid in uncertainty 
reduction via social support.
One way that TBI can influence the capacity to 
draw on social resources is via damage to those 
regions of the brain that impact a person’s capacity 
to mentalise effectively damage which impacts a per-
son’s capacities to mentalise (i.e. decode the mental 
states of others; Bowen, Yeates, & Palmer, 2010). We 
perceived, perhaps mistakenly, some lack of capac-
ity to appreciate the perspective of those close to P, 
associated with comments where P expressed frus-
tration with being regarded as a ‘medical case’ and 
‘different’.
P also referenced his experience of cognitive-
behavioural therapy (CBT) from his pre-TBI 
depression: “when I had my depression, I did a CBT 
course which is supposed to help. I maybe didn’t take 
it as seriously as I could but there were elements of it 
that were useful at the time. But my wife says that I 
became much more aggressive as a result of it. Now 
I think we also have friends who did couples coun-
selling prior to that and that was all about erm one of 
them being more assertive and I think she frames my 
CBT course in the same frame as their couples coun-
selling and she has in her head that I was supposed to884
come back from the CBT more assertive and says I 885
was more aggressive. That wasn’t what the CBT was 886
about but that is how she was interpreting” 887
This lead us to a consideration of how engage- 888
ment with a formal therapy prior to a brain injury 889
may influence the reaction and coping with a life- 890
threatening event, i.e. the brain injury itself. There 891
was some blunting of affect discernible in the tran- 892
script which could be attributed to the TBI and/or 893
perhaps the influence of a pre-TBI depression; P 894
presented awareness of ‘doing’ as a coping mech- 895
anism however the ‘feeling’ was not as apparent. It 896
is noticeable that P refers to the depression as ‘my 897
depression’ which implies an ownership or internal- 898
ization of it and he also acknowledged that there were 899
aspects of the CBT which he found useful during that 900
time. It could be that the CBT provided an alternative 901
explanation from the medical model and therefore 902
the ‘label’ under the psychiatric classification sys- 903
tem could be challenged and under his control. P also 904
referenced throughout the script his action-oriented 905
personality and there could be a link with action- 906
orientation and the implementation of behavioural 907
activation strategies that are prevalent in CBT as a 908
response mechanism. The use of actions can give a 909
sense of control, particularly when someone is cop- 910
ing with dys-executive changes brought about by a 911
brain injury (Evans, Emslie, & Wilson, 1998). There 912
is less evidence in the script of application of the 913
CBT cognitive skill strategies to the TBI. The TBI 914
itself is presented in a more medical light through 915
the linguistic presentation of how it occurred and its 916
impact. Another possible reason for presenting the 917
TBI in a medical light may be that the CBT became a 918
stressor as the perceived external reaction to it (from 919
his wife) was one of reproach and therefore, alter- 920
ing cognitive and, in turn, communication style, may 921
have been consciously avoided. P also highlighted in 922
his own words a common criticism in the literature 923
of the CBT approach in that in some cases it may 924
become overly focused on formulations at the indi- 925
vidual level of experience (Gaudiano, 2008) and that 926
it made him consider a more ‘holistic’ approach in 927
terms of addressing relationship issues—i.e. that ther- 928
apy would include significant others in the context of 929
a systemic approach. 930
A person’s capacity to navigate their social world 931
is compromised by TBI because it upsets delicate 932
social ecosystems in subtle ways (e.g. Newby, Coet- 933
zer, Daisley, & Weatherhead, 2013). We can see this 934
in P’s transcript, for example, in a section where he 935
says that, following the TBI, ‘I felt that I was fine 936


















































apart from the tiredness. My wife says that I have 
changed and that I was a lot different. She says that 
I, kids have noticed differences as well. When I talk 
to my kids, they say that it is not that different. My 
wife is saying that it is more different than they have 
said. But there’s a whole different perspectives thing 
going on’. We can see that, in line with the obser-
vation made by Newby et al, the TBI is a manifest 
source of uncertainty.
On the descriptive side, it seems that there is the 
appearance of some emotional detachment and the 
almost clinical description of the TBI event as if 
from a third party perspective. Might the 
engagement with therapy pre-TBI have influenced 
current cop-ing style? Or is there a worry that if the 
emotions are experienced, then the depression may 
re-emerge?It does come across as being more part of 
a nar-rative than a specific event and there is a sense 
of almost annoyance at other’s reactions. On consid-
ering the transcripts, we were drawn to the coping 
responses; doing the projects (e.g.” my personality is 
quite project focused”) yet we also made reference 
to retreating (I think we’ve both kind of retreated to 
our safe spaces, which is not interactive); we can see 
that P seems to be engaging with the practical - but 
not the interpersonal.
It is often the case that people close to TBI sur-
vivors experience changes that the survivor does not. 
It is also clear that there are biological, psychologi-
cal, and social aspects to the complex emotions (on all 
sides) associated with TBI (Newby, Coetzer, Daisley, 
& Weatherhead. 2013).
In order to most effectively address allostatic load, 
in a rehabilitation context, we argue that the clini-
cal focus needs to be on relational approaches (i.e. 
as per Bowen, Yeates, & Palmer, 2010). Social con-
text and relationships are therefore vital. We need to 
ensure that the capacity for shifting perspectives is as 
functional as possible
3.3. Self under stress
It is clear from the transcript that P embodies a self 
under stress. This is not at all unusual in the context 
of TBI.
At this point, it is important and necessary to out-
line exactly what we mean when using the word 
‘self’. In the contemporary neuropsychological reha-
bilitation literature ideas of personality have been 
superseded by concepts of cognitive representations 
of ‘self’ (Yeates, Gracey, & Collicutt McGrath, 
2008). Within the social identity approach, Simon986
(2004, p.9) suggests that multiple possible identities 987
emerge from interaction between individual brains 988
and their environments. Simon (2004) deploys the 989
idea of identity in a broad sense to cover phenomena, 990
and processes, discussed by others under the heading 991
‘self’ (Simon, 2004, p.2). We have followed Simon’s 992
lead with regard to defining ‘self’ and ‘identity’ in 993
this paper. 994
So, identity can be understood as the product of 995
self-interpretation processes which take place as the 996
result of social interaction (Simon, 2004). Hence we 997
are dealing with what might be regarded as a dialectic 998
(or paradox) where one pole of the concept of self is 999
social, and the other is individual. 1000
Social identities are those selves, based on valued 1001
group memberships, that constitute who, as indi- 1002
viduals, it is that each of us understand ourselves 1003
to be. At our base, each of us has social identi- 1004
ties, selves, that are relational and founded upon 1005
relationships. 1006
Walsh, Fortune, Gallagher, and Muldoon (2014) 1007
argue that in order for identities to be viable following 1008
TBI, survivors must be able to perform their identi- 1009
ties. It may be that this performative aspect of identity 1010
was the driver of P’s re-participation in a race that 1011
had almost killed him on his previous attempt. Hogg 1012
(2016) discusses social identity in the context of exis- 1013
tential threat and it is relevant that the idea of social 1014
identity itself, and social identity as a body of the- 1015
ory, was born out of existential threat in the theory 1016
founder’s own life1. 1017
Following TBI, the neuropsychological rehabilita- 1018
tion literature “consistently shows that TBI devastates 1019
relationships of all kinds” (Newby, Coetzer, Daisley, 1020
& Weatherhead, 2013, p.272.). Hence, according to 1021
Newby et al. (p.123) identities (or self-constructs) are 1022
rendered fragile and left threatened by TBI. 1023
Threatened identity is linked to the experience of 1024
uncertainty and people are motivated to reduce uncer- 1025
tainty (Hogg, 2016). Furthermore, as outlined earlier 1026
in this paper, uncertainty is intrinsic to the experience 1027
of allostatic load. It may well be that the experience 1028
of uncertainty ties into P’s projects (e.g. “I see my 1029
life in terms of projects. The whole doing the same 1030
event (after the injury) was a project. It was a big 1031
project, and I was just very focused on that. It wasn’t 1032
a catharsis thing. I didn’t do it because it, because I 1033
had to do it, it was because previously it was on my 1034
1The founder of Social Identity Theory, Henri Tajfel, was a Pol-
ish Jew who survived imprisonment by the Nazis as a consequence
of hiding his Jewish identity.
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tick list”) and in terms of psychology, factors relating1035
to efficacy (e.g. Bandura, 1995).1036
Hogg (2016, p.10) suggests that social categorisa-1037
tion is ‘particularly effective at reducing uncertainty1038
because it furnishes group prototypes that describe1039
how people (including self) will and ought to behave1040
and interact with each other’. To a significant degree,1041
being able to competently self-categorise reduces1042
uncertainty because the groups that we belong to1043
prescribe our behaviour when acting as members of1044
those groups. Conceptually, this is very close to the1045
metaphoric identity mapping (e.g. Ylvisaker et al.,1046
2008) with which many of us are more familiar.1047
Indeed, it may well be that there is utility in assess-1048
ing social categorisation skills in order to reduce1049
uncertainty for those living with TBI (based on Hogg,1050
2016)1051
Ontologically, human beings are social creatures1052
(e.g. Daniels, Cole, & Wertsch, 2007) and most use-1053
fully in terms of TBI rehabilitation, according to1054
Simon (2004), people are most usefully understood1055
in terms of process, rather than essence. Relatedly,1056
we need to think in terms of people rather than brains1057
- people have relationships with other people, brains1058
don’t. This point manifests powerfully in the current1059
paper when P talks about himself not being a medical1060
case and still being a ‘valid human being’1061
” So one particular stress around the sort of long1062
term effects and changes, I equate as very sim-1063
ilar to my experiences with depression. Erm, in1064
that 2 things. One is that my kind of denial and1065
inability to see how I’ve changed. It’s clear that1066
my wife, and she reports some of our friends, see1067
that I behave differently. And that I am somehow1068
quite different. And that’s not seen with my work1069
colleagues. So it is only people who are close1070
and sort of live with me or have experienced me1071
closely see those changes that maybe even I don’t1072
see. Some of them I can accept on a kind of intel-1073
lectual level. But I don’t see that I am radically1074
different now as I was then. Because that’s a con-1075
flict, I think that’s quite stressful. But then I see it’s1076
very similar as to when I was diagnosed with the1077
depression. People start, or at least it feels like1078
they start, treating me differently because they1079
now see you as a medical case and in both of1080
these I’ve always argued, it’s like ‘stop medical-1081
ising me.’ You’re treating me like I’m a case book1082
and I just find that really stresses me. I’m still1083
a person. I’m still a valid human being. It feels1084
like other people are always interpreting you and1085
analysing you through that perspective of ‘you’ve 1086
got a brain injury’ or ‘you’ve behaved differently’ 1087
or ‘your personality has changed’ or whatever it 1088
is. And it feels like you are no longer being taken 1089
at face value.” 1090
This tension between being a ‘valid human being’ 1091
and being a ‘medical case’ also shows that, as well 1092
as being exceedingly uncertain, the internalised per- 1093
spectives and judgements of others have a huge voice 1094
in P’s experience. This tension is adding to the uncer- 1095
tainty that is hovering with regard to physical and 1096
psychological integrity, mortality, and the myriad 1097
other issues facing P. 1098
We know from the literature that a person’s 1099
adjustment to life post TBI is dynamic. As such, 1100
relationships are important and, we argue, in think- 1101
ing about adjustment, we need to adopt a relational 1102
approach. A relational approach that commences 1103
with the survivor’s relationship with himself or 1104
herself (Newby, Coetzer, Daisley. & Weatherhead, 1105
2013). 1106
P describes his experience of TBI as akin to his 1107
diagnosis with depression. P perceives that people 1108
are treating him differently because he’s a ‘medical 1109
case’. Again, this experience conveys the impression 1110
of threat and uncertainty. 1111
Luders, Jonas, Fritsche, & Agroskin (2016) report 1112
that social exclusion has been found to increase 1113
aggressive behaviour. We get the sense from the tran- 1114
script that, probably unintentionally, P feels that he 1115
has been, to some degree, marginalised. Luders et 1116
al. (2016) argue that even in unfavourable situations, 1117
highlighting potential benefits, and highlighting dif- 1118
ferent ways of appraising the threat might change the 1119
perceived nature of threat and thereby help prevent 1120
negative outcomes. In other recent research, Green- 1121
away et al., (2014) report that reminding people that 1122
they have some control over potentially threatening 1123
events eliminated threat effects. 1124
4. Conclusion 1125
The key goal of this report is not to generate gen- 1126
eralisable knowledge. Rather, the intent was (is) to 1127
develop transferable knowledge that might be use- 1128
fully applied in both clinical and research contexts. 1129
There are many moving parts evident to those 1130
focused on a consideration of the lived experience 1131
of individuals who have experienced TBI. Paradox, 1132
shifting perspectives and self under stress were all to 1133
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the fore in the transcripts that were the basis for this1134
study. The thread that bound these factors together1135
was uncertainty.1136
In contemplating the apparent tension between a1137
need to focus on the individual, and the social, in1138
the context of rehabilitation following TBI, we were1139
faced with a question as to where the line should1140
be drawn between individual and social psychology.1141
Our conclusion, and our argument, is that, rather than1142
conceiving of the individual and social as binary1143
opposites, rehabilitation should approach the indi-1144
vidual and social as dialectic components of lived1145
experience. A relational approach that considers the1146
relationships a given person has, as well as the pres-1147
ence (or sometimes the absence) of significant others1148
within rehabilitation, is required.1149
Furthermore, because of the prominence of uncer-1150
tainty in the lived experience of P, it is our conclusion1151
that reducing uncertainty (allostasis) must be a key1152
component of post-TBI rehabilitation. This last point1153
in particular is crucial. Based on the evidence pre-1154
sented in this report, we suggest that key components1155
in this endeavour are likely to be social identities and1156
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